Future Issues Facing Boston: The Assessing Department by Hunkel, Janet L.
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
John M. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies Publications
McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global
Studies
12-1-1983
Future Issues Facing Boston: The Assessing
Department
Janet L. Hunkel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/mccormack_pubs
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Public
Administration Commons, Public Policy Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons,
Taxation Commons, Taxation-State and Local Commons, Tax Law Commons, and the Urban
Studies Commons
This Research Report is brought to you for free and open access by the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies at ScholarWorks at
UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in John M. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies Publications by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hunkel, Janet L., "Future Issues Facing Boston: The Assessing Department" (1983). John M. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies Publications. Paper 20.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/mccormack_pubs/20

FUTURE ISSUES FACING BOSTON:
THE ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
by
Janet L. Hunkei
Taxation and Cominunity Planning Analyst
Boston, vlassachusetts
Prepared for the John .v. \icCormack
Institute of Public Affairs
December 19S3
SUMMARY
Finance: The Assessing Department
3anet L. Hunkel
Taxpayers' opinions of municipal government often focus on the property tax.
Taxpayers are stingy, and they are critical as to whether their money is purchasing
competent services. For citizens to have faith that government is democratic,
taxes must be equitable — everyone must pay their fair share. For government to
function efficiently, tax administration must be efficient in order to support city
services.
The property tax is a complex, difficult tax to administer; it is vulnerable to
misuse. However, there have been recent, dramatic changes to the tax laws.
Municipal government in Massachusetts now has the political and legal
wherewithall to properly administer the tax. The new administration has a unique
opportunity to initiate programs promoting equity and efficiency. This paper
discusses three areas where they can act.
First, assure equitable taxes by maintaining assessments at full and fair market
value. This will require a Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) system, a
state of the art technological process which can generate consistently accurate
values for all of Boston's real etate.
Although all of Boston's property was revalued for Fiscal Year 1983, the
assessments were not generated by a CAMA system. The manual system which was
used has not withstood the test of quality. Research undertaken in conjunction
with this paper demonstrated that assessments were not equitable within one year
of the city-wide revaluation.
A CAMA is necessary in order to maintain equity as well as to satisfy certain
State Department of Revenue requirements. In particular, a Memorandum of
Understanding between the City and the State directs the CAMA's process and
product. The City should expect Fiscal Year 198^ tax bills to be based on the
CAMA.
Second, because the City relies upon the property tax for 35% of its revenue it
should assure that the legal maximum tax is levied. Since maximizing revenue can
conflict with the goal of equity it is imperative that action be taken in accordance
with the legalized standards. There is a certain flexibility in Proposition 2^2 and it
should be used to its best advantage. Where the law does not respond to Boston's
unique needs it should be amended.
Third, the City must build public confidence in its taxing function. Honesty and
integrity are goals which should permeate every aspect of government, revenue
producing or not; otherwise the public's confidence deteriorates and government
cannot function effectively. The Assessing Department needs internal policing
programs.
Looking ahead, there should be information about and public participation in
development of the CAMA system.
Immediate action should be taken on the 7000 Fiscal Year 1983 abatement
claims which the Assessing Department denied. The Assessing Department can and
should act on them in the first three months of 198^. This would eliminate the
need for taxpayers to seek relief through the Appellate Tax Board.
It is going to be tough: the property tax remains complex and vulnerable to
abuse. The City must commit to administer the tax professionally and must
acknowledge the need and legal responsibility of a CAMA. Then, taxpayers will
know they pay their fair share and further, that the process has integrity -- that
nobody has special benefits or access to power through taxation.
FUTURE ISSUES FACING BOSTON: THE ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUE
The focus of this paper is on how the next city administration can
professionally administer the property tax. The paper reviews how
well the Assessing Department is prepared to do so. It explains the
problems challenging the next city administration as well as
beneficial changes to the tax environment. It recommends certain
programs whereby the Assessing Department can improve its
administration and fulfill taxation's goals of equity and efficiency.
Taxes must be equitable—everybody must pay their fair share--in order
for citizens to have faith that their government is functioning
democratically. Tax administration also has a pragmatic goal: to be
efficient in collecting the tax. The City relies on the property tax
for 35% of its revenue. Prop 2 1/2 limits the tax levy, thereby
controlling the revenue side of the City's budget. Meanwhile, city
service needs must be accommodated and unavoidable fixed costs
continue to increase. Thus, the maximum, legally allowed amount of
taxes must be levied in order to sufficiently support City services.
Equity and efficiency have been neglected goals. In part this is
because the property tax is a problematic, complex tax to administer.
Unenforcement of some laws, indifference to reform of others,
technical difficulties and the administration's commitment to
development goals contribute to its complexity. As well, for decades
each city administration was confronted with a quagmire of an
assessing operation: assessments were inequitable, assessors
unqualified and the system lacked standards.
Good news! Changes have occurred in the political and legal
environments related to the property tax. New laws reflect much
needed reform and the State is enforcing these and pre-existing ones
uniformly. Because of the recent revaluation taxes were equitable for
the first time in decades and the political costs associated with
revaluation are behind the City. The new administration has a clean
slate from which the Assessing Department can professionally
administered the tax.
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II. KEY PROBLEM AREAS AMD RECOMMENDED ACTION
Some of the problems which hinder the Assessing Department, such as
Proposition 2 1/2 's limits of the property tax levy, are externally
imposed. Others are problems inherent in the Assessing Department and
require self -improvement to correct. The problems and recommended
action are summarized in this section. More detailed explanations are
in Section IV.
1) Problem: Assessments maintained at less than 100% market value are -
not equitable and do not allow for levying the maximum allowed tax
Action: Implement a Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA)
System to maintain equitable assessments based on full market value
The City recently revalued all property to reflect full and fair
market value. When completed, in Fiscal Year 1983, taxes were more
fairly distributed among neighborhoods, types of housing and classes
of property than they had been in decades. Tax payers were paying
their fair share.
Research done in conjunction with this project has found that
assessments began to lose equity within the first year of revaluation.
The root of the problem is that values were not generated by a
Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) system. CAMA is a process
where information on property and the real estate market is
assimilated and analyzed with the assistance of computers and then,
through the use of computer programs, the information is used to
generate a value for each parcel of property. Determining and then
maintaining accurate values on Boston's heterogeneous and extensive
number of parcels can only be accomplished with the manageability and
precision offerred by a CAMA system.
Originally a CAMA system was planned to generate the FY 1983 values.
Unfortunately it has never been fully operational. Besides the issue
of equity the Assessing Department must develop and implement a CAMA
to satisfy a Memorandum of Understanding between the City and the
State as well as other State requirements. The Assessing Department
should anticipate Fiscal Year 1986 tax assessments to be based on the
CAMA.
Full and fair values are also a means to assure for a maximum of
revenue. Proposition 2 1/2 's limit to 2 1/2% of the total taxable
property's value is calculated on the assessed value. If assessments
are less than market value, then the tax levy is less than its legal
limit and the City is depriving itself of much needed revenue.
Recommended Actions:
o Appoint a professional certified assessor as the Commissioner of
the Assessing Department
o Determine whether to plan and implement CAMA in-house or contract
it out
o Establish long range plans for the department; allocate personnel
according to needs; establish and coordinate budget needs with the
City Council
o Institute internal policing mechanisms such as security controls
for the computer and a code of ethics
2) Problem: Proposition 2 1/2 regulations restrict the property tax
levy, intensifying the need for efficient administration
Action: Understand and efficiently implement regulations
governing the property tax levy, advocate for certain regulatory
changes and improve administration to assure that all property is
properly taxed.
Proposition 2 1/2 changed the way many Massachusetts municipalities
establish their budgets and set their tax rate. No longer can a
municipality first determine what they will spend and then obtain the
money through simply setting the tax rate.' Now Proposition 2 1/2
regulations restrict the tax levy to 2 1/2% of the taxable property
value. No differently from one's personal budget, municipalities must
now determine their expenditures within the framework of available
funds
.
Because Boston relies upon the property tax for 3 5% of its revenue and
because the city needs money it is essential that the property tax
levy be maximized. This does not mean increasing the property tax
rate. Rather it means assuring that the regulations are properly
implemented so all property pays what is expected of it.
The regulations pose one particular, serious problem: they do not
readily allow increasing the tax levy beyond 2 1/2% of the tax base's
market growth. For example, if there is an overall property value
increase of 8% only 2 1/2% of the 8% can be taxed. Consequently, the
city forgoes the tax on the other 5 1/2%; or to look at it from a
larger perspective, the city is taxing only 94 1/2% of the tax base.
By Fiscal Year 1986 Boston will be taxing at less than 2 1/2% of full
value. The amount of lost revenue depends not only upon the market
appreciation of values but also the difference in assessment value
between the FY 86 values generated by the CAMA system and the existing
values
.
In general the regulations are good. They intensify the need of
proper administration. It becomes essential to assess property
correctly so abatements are minimized and to assure all property is
taxed equitably.
Recommended Actions:
o Understand regulations so the administration is prepared to
utilize them to their fullest capacity
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o Work to amend Proposition 2 1/2 to allow increasing the tax at the
rate of market growth
o Assure that all property is taxed through identification of and
placing on the tax rolls new construction, substantial rehabilitation,
and tax-exempt, income producing properties which do not meet
exemption regulations
o Minimize abatement payments through maintaining accurate
assessments
3) Problem: A lack of public confidence erodes the Assessing
Department's ability to function
Action: Implement internal policing programs and public outreach
Honesty and integrity are standards supported by all. These standards
should permeate every aspect of government, revenue producing or not.
A less than absolute standard lessens public confidence, which in
turn, inhibits the government's ability to function efficiently.
Property tax administration has been particularily resistant to
meeting high standards. History speaks -- the assessing functions
lack uniform controls and policy makers have used the tax for
development actions. The public response has been poor.
Underscoring these problems is taxpayer sensitivity to paying more
than their fair share. Actual inequities, complex procedures, simple
misunderstandings and intimidation are interpreted by tax payers as
Assessing Department misconduct. That does not build public
confidence.
Recommended Action:
o Improve efficency of the Assessing Department through the internal
policing and planning programs
o Assist tax payers with FY 1983 and FY 1984 abatements through
providing public information on procedures and hearing claims before
taxpayers are required to appeal with the Appellate Tax Board.
o Provide information about and public participation in development
of the CAMA system for the FY 1986 values
o Establish a public review board to assimilate market information
and assure continued maintenance of full values
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III. LOOKING BACK AT BOSTON'S ASSESSING PRACTICES
Entertainment value aside, there is reason to glance back into
Boston's history of property tax assessment. It is crucial for the
new administration to steer away from past practices which evolved
through erroneous reasoning and recently reformed laws and procedures.
It behooves any administration to withstand pressures for a return to
"the good old days" when only special interests had access. Finally,
the recent reforms were not comprehensive; the new administration
should be cognizant of recent influential tax changes and willing to
comply with them.
Following is a 'Reader's Digest' version of the history and tax
changes. History buffs will find additional information in Appendix
A.
There is Reason for the Tax's Unpopularity
For decades the property tax has been characterized by complexity and
talked about as corrupt. Its economic shortcomings have rallied
citizens from California to Massachusetts. The criticism was all well
deserved
.
One of the tax's major problems is setting assessments at less than
full and fair market value, a practice known as fractional assessment.
In and of itself assessing at less than the offical rate — which is
100% in Massachusetts was not a problem, so long as the
assessment-to-value ratio was the same for all classes of property and
for all the property within each class. That is equitable, but not legal
However, in Boston, not unlike other cities, there was a tremendous
disparity between the ratios for different classes of property.
Table I illustrates the extreme of inequitable assessments. Although
not represented on this table inequities also existed within the
residential class. In Charlestown the assessment to value ratio was
at 14% resulting in a $35 tax per $1000 of market value. In the
Washington Park area of Roxbury the ratio was 44% so the tax was $90
per $1000 of market value.
Table 1: ASSESSMENT-TO-VALUE AND EFFECTIVE TAX — 1972
CLASS ASSESSMENT- EFFECTIVE TAX ON $1000
TO-VALUE OF MARKET VALUE
RESIDENTIAL .27 $55
NEW COMMERCIAL .18 $3 7
OLD COMMERCIAL .52 $106
TOTAL-represents the
city wide average .32 ' $66
Source: Estimating the Impact of 100% of Market Value Property Tax
Assessments of Boston Real Estate. The Boston Urban Observatory. 1974
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One startling statistic sums up Boston's assessing practice: in the 50
years preceding revaluation Boston's assessed values increased 4%
while the tax rate increased over 1000%!!
The System was Insulated from Reform
The system was insulated from the implementation of full and fair
values, in part, through its own internal mechanism of abatements.
While abatements legitimately provide taxpayer relief they 'buy off'
any further complaints against the entire system. Taxpayer's suits
are the effective legal control over the system. Either they were not
initiated, due to ignorance that the system was so inequitable, or
suits were settled with abatements.
Further insulation was the political motivation to maintain the status
quo. As righteous as equity sounds, it typically shifted tax burdens
onto residential owners (read voters) . These people vote their
dissatisfaction. This political vulnerability was best expressed in
San Francisco-- following their revaluation bumper stickers begged
'Bring Back the Crooked Tax Assessor.'
Taxation used as a planning tool: the carrot approach
These administrative problems explain why there was tax payer
confusion over what assessments should be and how the tax should be
administered. The confusion and lack of controls allowed the
political forces to use the tax for purposes other than raising
revenue. In some instances it was abused for political and personal
gains. In others it was used as a carrot to plan development or
stabilize a neighborhood. By not increasing assessments, or by
cutting favorable deals on assessments and/or abatements, taxes
encouraged rehabilitation in depressed areas, permitted long term
owners to retain their homes, facilitated downtown high rise
development. In and of themselves these tax deals might appear to be
wise ways to develop a city. But, as a comprehensive tax program they
were not fair.
The property tax has an inherent defect: it is vulnerable to misuse.
The temptation to use the property tax for nonprimary purposes
compromises equity in favor of political ends.
Politics tromple homeowners: 100% to
Assessing has lacked standards; operating without uniformly enforced
laws and with little internal control over individual assessors. The
assessor's job is discretionary and subjective. There is temptation
for bribery. And the larger the municipality -- and consequently the
more complex the assessing -- the easier it is to hide mistakes. As
has been proven elsewhere in government, an environment is created
where incompetence or corruption are difficult to prove.
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Mistakes and personal or political gains were camouflaged as part and
parcel of the property tax. The consequenses? Selective access to
the power and money typically homeowners were excluded, whereas
influential property owners made the tax work to their advantage.
Voter's speak their 2 1/2% worth
The tax does have its economic shortcomings. In Boston the effective
tax burden (the percentage of the market value paid as tax) prior to
the implementation of Prop 2 1/2 was 10%. It was no surprise that
Boston voters supported Prop 2 1/2 by a 9 to 7 margin.
With all these problems, why not Proposition 0?
Inequity, abuse, poor administration, excessive tax burdens... why
have a property tax? Successful litigation and changes to the tax
laws are resolving many of these traditional negatives
The changes: a different climate
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered enforcement of full
and fair market value assessments, known as the Sudbury decision. It
brought a radical change: municipality-wide equity in taxes. Boston's
revaluation in FY 1983 resulted in more equity between classes of
property and neighborhoods than had occured in decades. Sudbury also
resulted in the State Dept. of Revenue gaining enforcement powers over
municipalities
.
Classification, passed in 1978, cushioned 100%'s financial impact on
residential property owners by maintaining the de facto practice of
undertaxing the residential category. Further, Classification's
enabling legislation, known as Chapter 797 of the acts of 1979,
provided massive tax reform. It established standards and provided
some municipalities with abatement relief.
Public frustration reached its fullest expression with the 1980
passage of Proposition 2 1/2. This simply limited the tax levy. The
effects, however, were complex. The municipality budget setting
process was reversed. In the "good old days" spending was planned and
then the money was raised by increasing the tax rate. Now, many
municipal budgets are no different than personal budgets. First the
amount of available money is acknowledged and then the spending
priorities are determined.
Also, Propostition 2 1/2 brought 3 consecutive years of tax reductions
to Boston. It had a particular impact on the FY 1983 bills. Prop 2
1/2 and Classification both cushioned revaluation's tax shifts.
Owners focused their attention on the favorable, lowered taxes and not
the issue at hand: whether the assessment was accurate or not.
Consequently revaluation was acceptable.
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Besides legal and political changes technological advances,
particular i ly computers, entered the world of assessing. They give
the Assessing Dept. tools to administer the tax efficiently.
The Context—A New Tax Environment
The reoccuring theme of these changes is that the political and legal
constraints on tax administration have improved. The City has gone
through revaluation, reasonable laws and standards are being enforced,
new laws have been passed, technology brings efficient and accurate
capabilities. This creates an environment which allows a professional
administration of the tax.
Changes alone do not guarentee equity and efficiency. It is essential
for the next administration, first of all, to confirm its commitment
to administer the tax professionally. The next step is for the
administration to understand how prepared the Assessing Dept. is and
what programs are required in order to properly administer the tax.
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IV. PRIMARY DECISION OPTIONS
1) The City Must Develop a Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal System to
Maintain Equitable Values
In Fiscal Year 1983 the City assessed all real and personal property
at 100% of its full and fair market value. Revaluation's purpose is,
of course, to assure for equity. And indeed, in Boston revaluation
resulted in more equitable taxes among classes of property and
neighborhoods than any tax distribution in memory.
Research done in conjunction with this project has found that
assessments began to lose equity within the first year of revaluation.
The root of the problem is that values were not generated by a
Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) system. CAMA is a process
where information on property and the real estate market is
assimulated and analyzed with the assistance of computers and then,
through the use of computer programs, the information is used to
generate a value for each parcel of property. It offers the
manageability and precision needed to assess Boston's 100,000 parcels
and to maintain the values over time. In accordance with a Memorandum
of Understanding between the City and the State and other State
regulations Boston must develop a CAMA. The Assessing Dept. should
expect the FY 1986 values to be generated by CAMA.
This section of the paper first explains the current status of the
Assessing Dept's system. Acknowledging that a CAMA is necessary the
section outlines the steps in implementing one; the procedures and
performance standards in DOR's and the City's Memorandum of
Understanding; and the Assessing Dept.'s current plans for developing
a CAMA system. Concluding this section are recommendations.
The Current Status of the Assessing Department's System
The CAMA originally planned by the City's Office of Property
Equalization (OPE) and approved by the State DOR did not generate the
Fiscal Year 1983 values. Instead, the values were based on a manual
system. To be specific, the values were determined by independent
appraisers (contracted by OPE) who based the value on data originally
collected by OPE, sales information and exterior inspection. Granted,
even the manual system could not have been accomplished without
computer assistance. However, the manner in which computers were used
did not constitute a CAMA system. For example, one of the key
elements of a CAMA is the computer based models; OPE ' s models did not
generate the residential class's values.
The result of not generating and maintaining assessments on a CAMA is
that assessments can not be maintained at full and fair market value.
Research undertaken for this project analyzed the quality of
assessments one year after the city-wide revaluation. It measured the
uniformity of assessments on single family homes which sold in 1982
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relative to the sales prices. The research clearly points out that
assessments began to lose equity within the first year of revaluation.
According to industry standards the assessments are not within the
acceptable range of uniformity.
Table 2 illustrates that uniformity was achieved from the city-wide
revaluation and that uniformity was lacking one year after. As a
point of interest the recent CODs can be compared to CODs from one
year prior to revaluation by looking at both Tables 1 and 2. It says
that the disparity, or lack of uniformity, of current assessments is
approaching the same unacceptable level immediately preceeding
revaluation. Again, this indicates that revaluation without a CAMA
system cannot maintain equitable assessments.
For further information on the statistical research refer to Appendix
B. Briefly stated COD is the typical statistical measure for
uniformity of individual assessments relative to market value. The
Internation Association of Assessing Officers (lAAO)'s standard COD on
single family homes is less than 15%. The DOR standard is 10%.
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Table 2
Coefficients of Dispersion of Assessments to Sales Ratios:
Year of Revaluation vs. One Year Following Revaluation
Single Family Residential
1981 Sales to FY 83 1982 Sales to FY
Assessments Assessments
Ward Median COD Mean (a) COD
1 100 .08 87 .26
2 100 .09 77 .36
3 98 .11 b
4 b b
5 105 .09 89 .46
5 100 . 15 81 .43
7 b 84 .18
8 b b
9 b b
10 b b
11 103 .11 92 .20
12 b b
13 102 .10 83 .24
14 b b
15 103 .08 b
16 102 .06 98 .17
17 102 .07 97 .16
18 100 .09 93 .16
19 102 .09 95 .12
20 102 .08 100 .13
21 100 .05 b
22 101 .10 90 .17
a the mean was verified against the median; there was no significant
difference
b insufficient sample
Source: 1981 sales/FY 1983 assessments from information prepared by
the City of Boston's Assessing Dept. for the Dept. of Revenue
1982 sales/FY 1984 assessments from information prepared by
the City of Boston's Assessing Dept. for the Dept. of Revenue; means
and CODs calculated by McCormack Institute
Table 3
Coefficients of Dispersion of Assessments to Sales Ratios:
Year Preceeding Revaluation
Single Family Residential
Planning District COD
1-East Boston .25
2-Char lestown .36
3-North End, Waterfront a
4-Back Bay, Beacon Hill, Bay Village a
5-Chinatown, South Cove a
6-Fenway, Kenmore a
7-Al Is ton-Brighton .25
8-Mission Hill a
9-South End .53
10- South Boston .35
11-Jamaica Plain .23
12-Roxbury .36
13-Uphams Corner, Dorchester .43
14-Roslindale .21
15-Mattapan .19
16-Fields Corner, Dorchester .30
17-West Roxbury .18
18-Hyde Park .21
a insufficient sample
Source: "Supplemental Report on Quality of Assessments and Future
System for Quality Control", prepared by Thomas L. Jacobs and
Associates, Inc. Chicago, IL for The City of Boston Assessing Dept.
May, 1982.
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These inconsistencies were magnified with the FY 1984 assessments.
The Assessing Dept. increased the FY83 (revaluation) assessments by
uniform percentages to determine the FY84 assessments. This is known
as trending. It is an acceptable process to maintain parity with the
market for the years between the State's required tri-annual
recertif ication . It is not without problems if assessments are not
accurate. For example, consider two similar single family houses both
worth $75,000 but assessed at $65,000 and $72,000. If their
neighborhood's trending factor was 9% the FY 1984 assessments would be
$70,850 and $78,480. Whereas the difference had been $7,000 it is now
$7630.
There are State regulations which require assessments to be maintained
at full and fair market value. They establish a strict timetable for
the City. As part of the State DOR's certification of the FY 1983
values the City agreed to develop a CAMA system. This agreement,
known as the May 31, 1983 Memorandum of Understanding, stipulates the
CAMA system "...to be fully operational and is to be implemented on or
before June 30, 1984." Deputy Commissioner Edward Collins Jr. stated
that the MOD shows good, strong evidentiary intent of the signing
parties. Coupled with DOR's statutory powers the City administration
will need to comply. They can no longer treat it as a political
document. In addition. State legislation requires all municipalities
to revalue every third year. Boston is required to do so in FY 1986.
The MOU implies that the CAMA will generate the FY 1985 values which
meet DOR's requirements. Realistically speaking, the next
administration will not have sufficient time to generate the FY 1985
values from a CAMA system. Although the legal agreement is under
DOR's interpretation and control it appears reasonable to the author
that the City must have a CAMA system planned with development
seriously under way by June 30,1984 and that system must generate the
FY 1986 by Fall, 1986.
CAMA System
As the name implies, CAMA is an 'assist', not a replacement for
appraising. Computer involved activity is a highly developed tool to
manage information. The system requires accurate data, which is
collected by people, and evaluation of factors, which is accomplished
by human discretion. As the name also implies it is 'mass appraisal'.
Although data and assessments are specific to each property, the
appraisals themselves are based on standard, easily quantifiable units
of comparison as contrasted to analyzing the value of specific
elements on each individual house.
In addition to valuation, a CAMA undertakes tax administrative
functions such as the preparation of tax impact notices, tax bills and
other listing or reportive tasks. It also undertakes data management.
Although these two subsystems are important, and hence mentioned, this
section focuses on the valuation subsystem.
One can not overstate the glories of computers. Their analytic
capabilities have greatly expanded assessment functions. While many
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functions are not inherently complex in concept they do involve
complex mathematics and a multitude of iterative processes demanding
precision. The computer handles this without complaint. Computers
are wonderfully proficient at repetitive tasks such as preparing
rolls. They can sort through information, store it, aggregate it and
manipulate it. And they are cost efficient.
Computers can provide these functions only to the extent that people
assemble and organize the information and effectively implement the
components of appraisals. Thus, many of the labor intensive tasks
such as data collection and updating maps are not eliminated. Nor is
the need for human judgement eliminated, such as determining which
approach to value should be utilized or where market boundaries have
changed. With these appropriate warnings of what to expect of a
computer one can better understand how a CAMA system suitable to
Boston would be organized.
The steps in developing a valuation system, with specific attention to
Boston's needs, are explained as follows. The purpose of this section
is to establish the parameters of what one should expect of Boston's
system.
1) Planning
Planning establishes the program, schedule and cost. Once it is
determined that a CAMA system is necessary then the Assessing Dept.
must decide whether to plan and implement the system in-house or
contract with a professional appraisal company.
The first step is to select the appropriate type of system. This
decision is primarily based on testing of property characteristics to
determine which ones contribute to value. It is also important to
determine which system will best satisfy tax administration needs.
Next the planners evaluate existing resources, design manuals and data
collection forms, establish market data and valuation standards, test
appraisal techniques, determine the appropriate methodologies,
recruit and train project staff, and initiate a public education and
outreach program. In accordance with State regulations DOR must
approve the plan. The City Council and the Mayor must approve the
budget, for at least the forthcoming fiscal year.
2) Pre-va lua tion or *pre-model ing
:
This step coordinates different elements of the system. It produces
the computer programs which analyze the data for purposes of
estimating value. To accomplish this it analyzes market data and
neighborhood characteristics to define the market dynamics and
delineate neighborhood boundaries. These boundaries will be utilized
to compare similar properties. It determines land value units. And
it also refines which data elements are to be used for which specific
methodologies. In this refinement procedure the valuation formulae or
models are adjusted to reflect specific trends or uniqueness that are
beginning to emerge from the market and data characteristics.
This step is an iterative process of refining the data and
methodologies. Therefore it is initiated prior to and is continued
throughout the data collection process.
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3) Data Collection:
Data collection is one of the most crucial steps in providing for a
quality product: "garbage in, garbage out" symbolizes what can be
wrong with computer related tasks. It is also the most costly and
time consuming step in the process. Data should not begin prior to
the preceeding steps.
Data is collected to create two interrelated files. One is the
property record file. It documents the physical characteristics of
property which assist in determining the values. It may involve as
many as 20-50 entries of objective information, such as type of
construction, number of rooms, and property use. It also involves
some subjective information such as the condition of the property, the
quality of original construction and the attributes of the
neighborhood. Income and expense information for income producing
property is requested from the owners.
A quality control system must be established to insure success. This
involves periodically checking a high percentage of the field work.
Supervisors and/or independent appraisers would be responsible for
such verification. Data can also be checked through verifying it with
the property owners.
A sales file is also created. It contains the property
characteristics plus sales from the previous 2-3 years. Financial
considerations are noted, specifically sales are qualified as to
whether they are 'arms-length' i.e. whether a sale is between a
willing seller and buyer and does not involve special situations such
as a sale between relatives, foreclosure, zoning change to name a few
conditions. The sales file is the 'market value ruler' against which
unsold properties are measured.
4) Valuation
Valuation is the result of data collection and pre-valuation. It
produces preliminary estimates of value based on the data and
methodologies. If models and data have been accurately prepared there
should be little difference between the value generated by one
methodology relative to another. At this step the differences can be
reconciled through knowledge of the data and models or through the
field review.
The valuation run produces a 'value review document'. It contains the
data characteristics, value produced by each methodology, comparable
properties and an evaluation of this information. Experienced
appraisers use this information to determine the final values.
5) Field Review:
This is the final step of the mass appraisal process. It is a
parcel-by-parcel, field review of all of the computer generated
values. It requires professional appraisers who understand the
complete valuation process. They use and correct the 'value review
document' generated from the valuation step.
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The field review is considered the single most important component of
any revaluation project. It checks any specific problems observed by
those working with the system, refines values of properties located on
neighborhood boundaries, confirms that similar properties are
equitably assessed and verifies the accuracy of data collection. The
field reviewers can override computer generated values. Because of
this discretion it is imperative that strict review procedures are
established, sufficient time and funds are allocated and all changes
are thoroughly documented. Uniformity is critical. A procedures
mannual assists in this regard as does using a minimum of field
reviewers
.
6) Preliminary Certification Review, Taxpayer Impact Notices
and Informal Hearings and Final Certification
These steps involve DOR and taxpayer review of the values. Successful
completion results in State certification and mailing of the bills.
DOR and the City of Boston's May 31, 1983 Memorandum of Understanding
Besides the standard CAMA procedures which the City should be expected
to follow the City has specific tasks as agreed to with the Dept. of
Revenue
.
On May 31, 1983 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by
officials of the DOR, the City of Boston's Assessing Dept. and the
Deputy Mayor for Fiscal Affairs. It states "... the City's CAMA
system has to date been unable to generate values which meet the
minimum standards, statistical and otherwise, set forth in guidelines
published by the Department of Revenue." Therefore, it required the
Assessing Dept. to implement the necessary CAMA system, as the City
had originally planned to do and as the State had previously approved.
The MOU goes on to outlined the steps or implementation requirements.
They are summarized as follows under specific tasks, performance
criteria and DOR's controls. ("At issue" are an explanation of what
the steps attempt to resolve; they have been added by the author.)
The specific tasks are:
o Establish implementation plan: A work schedule, staffing
plan and cost estimate to complete the above must be submitted to DOR.
City agrees to use their best efforts to secure the necessary
appropriation. (At issue: a work plan will allow the DOR and their
monitor to assure that the appropriate tasks are being accomplished on
schedule
.
)
o Data: Data must be collected, via inspections of property
sold in the 1982 calender year and documentation of updated expenses
and income. The purpose is to establish valid units of comparison
from which other property values can be determined. (At issue: prior
selection of the key data elements to be used in estimating values was
not properly coordinated with the modeling. As a result incorrect
data was collected.)
o Valuation testing: Property characteristics must be tested
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to determine which ones contribute to the property value. (At issue:
this was part of the problem cited under data.)
o Methodology: Methodologies to estimate value must be
selected and their suitablity assured through adaptation to Boston's
unique situations.
o Verification of data: All data upon which values are based
must be verified as to its accuracy, uniformity and completeness of an
inventory. The DOR requires a thorough and ongoing data quality
study. As a quality control the DOR recommends mailing owners the
data on their property and requesting verification. (At issue : If
inaccuracies are pervasive then all data will need to be recollected.)
o Generate values: The CAMA system must generate values which
are then verified. (At issue: prior CAMA generated values did not
correlate with actual values as determined by sales.)
Further, the MOU notes performance criteria which the CAMA and
the Assessing Dept. must meet. They are:
o Continual maintenance: The CAMA must be set up to
accommodate ongoing maintenance of values through continual data
collection, methodology adaptation and sales verification. Also, the
Assessing Dept. personnel should be trained to implement the system.
o dor's testing and verification of separate elements: Such
review would include, but not be limited to, verifying the data base
and valuation models. This would allow DOR to monitor the process on
an ongoing basis with the intent to arrest any inaccuracies and
prevent systemic problems.
To assure for proper execution of the agreement the DOR noted that it
would
:
o Retain an independent consultant Jcnowledgable in the CAMA
field to monitor, review and analyze the progress. The City and State
will share the ccst.
o Seek enforcement of any provision through the courts. The
MOU does not reference what will happen if CAMA is not implemented by
June 30, 1984. Nor is there any precedent. DOR is empowered to take
over a municipality's revaluation if it does not. satisfy their
requirements. They can also deny certification of the tax rate,
thereby preventing the mailing of tax bills.
The Assessing Department's Plan to Implement the CAMA System
The Assessing Dept. recently prepared a work plan, schedule and cost
estimate. It will be available to the new administration. As it was
not available to the author at the time of preparing this report the
following is based cn interviews with people who have a working
knowledge of the plan.
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The work plan is based, in part, on information from two consultants,
Robert Kitchen, Deputy Executive Director of the N.Y. Division of
Equalization and Assessment and Bruce Sauter, from the same agency.
It is also based on a verification program which the department
undertook in summer, 1983. This was to determine the extent of work
which the Assessing Dept. would be required to do; it is based on how
much of OPE ' s material could be reused. The program tested the
quality of data and values. Further, the work plan used information
from the trending analysis upon which the Fiscal Year 1984 assessment
increases were based (refer to Appendix B)
.
Publically the Assessing Dept. maintained that the revaluation was
satisfactory and that the system was merely being refined. People
knowledgeable with the system acknowledge that the information provided
by OPE could not be reused in building a CAMA system. The Assessing
Dept.'s work plan assumes this scope of work.
The work plan recommends that the Assessing Dept. both organize the
implementation of the CAMA system and maintain it once it is
functioning. The implementation will require, for certain specific
functions, the use of independent contractors and consultants. For
example. Commissioner Edward Jay believes the initial data collection
is better accomplished by a contactor who specializes in such work and
not by Assessing personnel. Contracting allows the trained Assessing
Dept. data collectors to function as the quality control over the
contractor. Other tasks will be done by the Assessing Dept.
personnel
.
In order for the in-house maintenance of the system to succeed a
strong operational manager is required. Selection for this position
was not completed by the end of 1983.
The steps in the plan are as follows:
1) Data Collection
Based on the Assessing Dept.'s data verification of properties sold
in 1982 and a systematic review of parcels in Wards 21 and 22
(Allston-Brighton)
,
they determined that all of the data for Rl-3 and
Condominiums would need to be recollected.
The task of collecting the data will be contracted out. As part of
the above cited verification process the Assessing Dept., under the
guidance of a consultant, trained personnel to collect data. They did
collect data for the testing. They will function as the quality
control over the contractor. These same personnel will maintain data
once it is collected by the contractor and CAMA is implemented.
The Assessing Dept.'s current plans are to further verify the data
through owner review. They plan to use a verification mailer to do
this.
2. Valuation or program
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This step will adapt methodologies to Boston's unique situations. The
methodologies to be used are a Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA)
based on the market approach and the Cost Replacement New less
Depreciation (CRNLD) . Success in implementation requires a superior
Operations Manager skilled in CAMA systems. This is an in-house
function.
3. Land Values
Similar to the data collection this will be contracted out for the
initial first time task. Maintenance will be undertaken by the
Assessing Dept. Land value is essential for the Cost Replacement
methodology as well as the valuation of vacant land and land where
existing buildings are not the property's highest and best use.
Further, it is required for certain federal tax reasons.
4. Mapping
All parcels must be mapped with a computer link. Although this is not
essential for producing computer generated values a digitized mapping
system is a cost efficient resource.
5. Data base management
A data base management system must be developed in order to
coordinate the computer functions.
Recommended Actions for the Administration to Take in Developing a
CAMA
The following recommended actions are intented to assist the new
administration in undertaking the development of a CAMA system,
o Appoint a professional certified assessor as the Commissioner of
Assessing
The presence of political appointees in such a sensitive position
undermines the department's credibility. Moreover, the development
and maintenance of a CAMA system demands that the management is
professionally qualified to monitor it.
o Determine whether to plan and implement the CAMA in-house or to
contract out the function
This decision should be made as soon as possible in order to meet the
schdule, coordinate budgeting and personnel. It should also be made
in light of the problem that bids for the data collection contract
have been received. If this contract were to be awarded it would
precede the pre-modeling step.
o Establish long range plans for the department as well as annual
plans to allocate appropriate personnel and budget levels
The long range perspective will contradict the typical short term
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crisis planning. It will assist in determining the necessary
personnel level and funding. This information should be coordinated
with the City Council.
o Institute internal policing mechanism of security controls on
access to the computer and a code of ethics
As our technology changes we must adapt new procedures which insure
for the integrity of the process. Security controls on the computer
are essential.
A code of ethics is an important standard for any department. Given
the discretionary and oftentimes unsupervised nature of assessing such
a code is essential.
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2) Proposition 2 1/2 and Related Controls on Revenue
This section identifies the status of Boston's value and tax levy;
summarizes Proposition 2 1/2 's limits on the levy (the excruciating
boring details are in Appendix C) ; explains how abatements erode the
tax levy; and recommends some actions for how to be most efficient at
levying the tax given these controls. This information will
familiarize policy makers with some of the constraints and
flexibilities of the tax.
Boston's Tax Base and Taxes in a Glance
Despite 3 consecutive years of tax levy reductions and increases in
State aid Boston still heavily relies upon the property tax. Fiscal
Year 1983 's $374.6 million levy was approximately 43% of all City
revenues. The Fiscal Year 1984 levy is 35%.
Table 4: BOSTON REMAINS DEPENDENT ON THE PROPERTY TAX (in millions)
FY Total Rev Levy Tax as % of Total Revenue
81 $ 878 $ 519 60%
82 838 414 53
83 780 374 48
84 950 333 35
Source: Boston Assessing Dept.
Boston is, at long last, at the sacred 2 1/2% effective tax rate
level. This occured in Fiscal Year 1984 through a combination of
increasing the tax base and reducing the tax levy.
Table 5: BOSTON'S TAX LEVY IS AT THE PROPOSITION 2 1/2 LEVEL
FY Value o f Property Levy Levy as % of Value
81 a $ 5.2 Billion b $519 M 10.0%
82 7.5 B b 441 5.9%
83 12.2 B 374 3.1
84 13.3 B 333 2.5
a) 1981 was the last fiscal year preceding implementation of Prop 2
1/2
b) State dor's Equalized value
Source: Boston Assessing Dept.
The value of Boston's taxable property is expected to increase through
new construction and increased market value. This allows the city tc
increase the tax levy, within the limits of the Proposition 2 1/2
regulations
.
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Table 6: TAX BASE AND TAX LEVY PROJECTION: FISCAL YEAR 1984-1986
FISCAL YEAR TAX BASE
$ 13.3 B
14.4
15.7
TAX LEVY
$ 333.3 M
359 .2
385 .4
TAX AS % OF VALUE
84
85
86
2.5
2.5
2.45
SOURCE: Boston's Fiscal Future: Prognosis and Policy Options for 1984
to 1986 by Joseph S. Slavet and Raymond G. Torto
The chart's last column provides a convenient introduction to one of
Propostion 2 1/2 's problems specific to Boston. The procedures for
adding increased value to the tax base will result in Boston taxing at
less than the 2 1/2% rate by FY 1986.
Proposition 2 1/2 Changes Our Lives
As an initiative petition Proposition 2 1/2 required action by the
State legislature to become law. The result was Chapter 580 of the
acts of 1980. This was amended by the legislature in 1981 as Chapter
782. Propostion 2 1/2, at this very moment is being amended, and can
continue to be amended.
Proposition 2 1/2 's Golden Rule is: the tax levy can not exceed 2 1/2%
of the full and fair market value of the municipality's taxable
property [Chapter 792, Section 21c (b) ] . Typical of Prop 2 1/2 there
is an exception to this; a municipality's debt service can be excluded
from the limit thereby allowing the total levy to exceed the 2 1/2%
level [Chapter 782, Section 21c (a)].
Some other generalizations of Proposition 2 1/2 help one to understand
the law. The regulations require tax increases to be tied, as one
would expect, to the growth in the tax base. The levy's increase is
limited, however, to not only the Golden Rule's 2 1/2% limit, but also
to the prior year's tax levy.
The 1981 amendment. Chapter 782, introduced flexibility so
municipalities could better adapt the tax to their specific needs.
They allow, on the one hand, for specific exclusions which enable a
municipality to increase taxes. These require voter approval. But,
they also protect the spirit of Prop 2 1/2 by dismissing the prior
opportunity to override the 2 1/2% levy restriction. Specific
regulations, which could possibly affect Boston, are reviewed in
Appendix C.
There is one particular, serious limitation. The current regulation
does not readily allow increasing the tax levy in excess of 2 1/2% of
the tax base's market growth. For example, if the existing property
values increased by 8%, only 2 1/2% of the 8% would be taxed.
Consequently the City forgoes the tax on the other 5 1/2% of market
value, or to look at it from a larger perspective, the City is taxing
only 94 1/2% of the tax base at the rate of 2 1/2%. Voter approval is
the only way to increase the tax up to the 2 1/2% level. By Fiscal
Year 1986 it is estimated that Boston will be taxing at a rate of less
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than 2 1/2%. The amount of money lost depends upon the market
appreciation of values and the difference in assessment value between
the FY 86 values generated by the CAMA system and the existing values.
One other Prop 2 1/2 provision is worth noting. The tax levy can be
reduced below the 2 1/2% level if approved by local voter referenda.
The question can be placed on the ballot either through 2/3 vote of
the council or a voter initiative. Passage requires a simple majority
of those voting.
Recommended Actions:
o Understand the regulations in order to implement them to their
fullest flexibility
o Advocate for legislation which would allow fully taxing all
valuation increases due to maintaining parity with the market. The
process would be to add all valuation increases to the prior year's
assessed value and then determine the tax rate.
o Assure that new construction and substantial rehabilitated parcels
are immediately put on the tax rolls
o Assure that income producing, tax-exempt properties are properly
recorded as to their tax liability. Refer to Appendix D for a brief
explanation of requirements.
Abatements
Control over the amount of abatements is the natural, logical product
of maintaining equitable assessments and professionally managing the
assessing function. That is not to say, however, that it is an easy
task. The following explains the correlation between abatements and
revenue loss and recommends action to better control the system.
Correlation between abatements and revenue
The crux of the problem is that abatement payments are a reduction of
the tax levy. In monetary terms this means that of FY 1984 's $333
million levy, the total taxes collected will be reduced by abatement
payments. There is no way to redistribute that loss among the City's
other tax payers; obviously the tax can not be recalculated and prior
habits of increasing the following year's tax rate have been stopped
by Prop 2 1/2 's control over the municipal equation.
In the past abatement payments have seriously eroded the City's
revenues. In 1970, for example, $15 million was refunded; 6 % of the
year's tax levy. That money would otherwise be available for
services. Liabilities, although they must eventually be paid, are not
always distributed out of the current budget. If the claim is not
immediately settled, which occurs when it goes to the Appellate Tax
Board (ATB) , the liabilities accumulate. Tregor represented several
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years accumulation totaling $150 million! Obviously a $333 million
tax levy can not cover abatements plus city services. In this case
special bonding and new taxes were necessary.
Past abatements delivered justice, albeit short sighted, for
inequitable taxes. Full and fair value assessments and equitable
taxes eliminate the need for abatements for all but genuine assessing
errors. From the perspective of how to maximize revenues, equitable
assessments are necessary to prevent any potential revenue loss due to
abatements
.
Problem # 1 reviews the need for a Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal
(CAMA) system to maintain equitable values. And as equitable values
are the crux of minimizing abatements the need for CAMA is also
mentioned relative to abatements. One obvious reason is that CAMA, by
virtue of maintaining equitable values, will minimize the number of
abatement claims. A more subtle reason is that the quantitative and
methodological substance offered by a CAMA system is needed for the
Assessing Dept. to adequately^efend non-legitimate abatement claims.
Recommended Actions on Abatements
o Maintain equitable values with a CAMA system
o Correct assessments once an abatement has been agreed to
The abatement procedure remains as the property owner's relief from an
error or disproportionate assessments between and within classes. If
an owner files for an abatement and it is granted then that says the
value is wrong. Past practices were to abate only the tax, requiring
the owner to refile the next year. The correct procedure would be for
the Assessing Dept. to change the value. This establishes the correct
assessment base, in the following year, upon which the levy is
determined.
-PAGE 24-
3) Public Confidence
A lack of honesty and integrity in our government deteriorates the
public's confidence. This erodes government's ability to function
efficiently. The property tax has been particularly resistant to
standards and good administration. Policy makers have been tempted to
use the tax for other than revenue generating purposes. The public
has had a poor understanding and acceptance of the tax.
This section recommends some specific programs related to building
public confidence. Some are internal while others are public
outreach. Each program is rooted in specific problems, some long term
while others are immediate and temporary. (Due to the diverse nature
of the programs the problem is discussed in conjunction with the
action.
)
Recommended Action:
Internal Departmental Programs
1) Establish internal planning and policing programs to
improve the efficiency of the Assessing Dept. These programs were
described under the development of the CAMA system, pages 19 and 20.
There are:
o Establish a code of ethics and conflict of interest
statement
o Develop computer security
o Establish staff positions and budget to reflect
departmental needs
o Appoint a professional certified assessor as Commissioner
Public Outreach
FY 1983 and FY 1984 Abatements Have Not Been Reviewed
Abatements for FY 1983 will not be settled prior to January, 1984.
This is due, in part, because the abatement schedule differed for the
FY 1983 bills. These bills were mailed at the end of June, 1983. Tax
payers had until the end of July to file for an abatement. The
Assessing Dept.'s standard procedures are to respond within 3 months
as to whether they will allow an abatement or not. This year, typical
of other municipalities undergoing revaluation for the first time, the
City was granted a 3 month extension to respond on their
determination. That changed the deadline to January, 1984. The
Assessing Dept. did not take action on some 7,000 abatements and "^^^^^
with only certain, select ones. Without action all of the abatement
claims will be denied.
The Assessing Dept. will send property owners who filed for an
abatement a Notice of Inaction in January, 1984. An owner can take
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several actions. They can drop the claim. Or they can pursue it by
again asking the Assessing Dept. to hear it. The Assessing Dept. has
three months during which to respond. And/or the owner can also
appeal the decision to the Appellate Tax Board, unfortunately this can
be a lengthy, cumbersome process involving some costs for the tax
payer and the city.
Close on the heels of the FY 1983 abatements are those for FY 1984.
Their 3 month determination date will be February, 1984.
The 7,000 abatements are on a total property value of $ 3.5 Billion,
one-third of the total taxable property. Aside from the loss of
revenue, which no estimate was available from the Assessing Dept., the
public perception is that the Assessing Dept. was unresponsive. That
undermines the revaluation process in particular and the Assessing
Dept. in general.
Recommended Action:
The new administration can help ease the public perception by taking
several actions. For one they can provide public information to those
who filed for an abatement. Further they should hear abatement claims
during the coming 3 month period to eliminate the need for owners to
file with the ATB.
Information About and Public Participation in the Development of the
CAMA System
As part of the development of the CAMA system and the FY 1986
certification the Assessing Dept. should inform and involve taxpayers.
o Data collected on each property should be verified by the
owner as part of data collection's quality control.
o As part of the certification process the Assessing Dept. is
required to hold public hearings with taxpayers on the proposed
assessments. These hearings should provide taxpayers with information
specific to both their property and the comparable properties used in
determining the value as well as an opportunity to contest the value.
o General information provided on a continual basis furthers
public understanding and acceptance of the process.
o An open, forthright attitude will reflect the degree of
honesty in the development of the system.
Coordinate Information with Public and Private Interests
The Assessing Dept. does not have the market expertise of the real
estate industry or the local knowlege of neighborhood groups. In
order for the Assessing Dept. to be more proficient in interpreting
market trends it would be beneficial to utilize these resources.
Due to the very competitive nature of the real estate industry the
best process for coordinating information is a Review Board. It would
consist of representatives from the real estate industry, both
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commercial and residential, and civic and neighborhood organizations.
The purpose would be to interpret market trends on a first hand,
informative basis and to assure that assessments were being maintained
at 100%. Some suggested tasks are:
o Review abatement applications for trends in market changes
o Review on going statistical studies, such as COD of sales
and quality controls of data collection
o Review rents and sales and discern any influencing factors
o Keep current on zoning changes, development plans and
neighborhood problems
V. CONCLUSION
As the new administration, you face the reality of balancing a budget
while confronted with substantial deficits and rising fixed costs.
Meanwhile you wish to honor the spirit of your campaigns by
maintaining acceptable levels of service and initiating new programs.
Money counts. Assuring that government is fair and accessible makes a
difference
.
It is popular to complain that there is too much dependency on the
property tax. And indeed nobody is arguing against increases in State
and Federal aid to reduce the proportion of the tax while not reducing
the amount. But, in these concluding comments I urge you to take a
fresh look at the property tax. Look at it as a viable resource.
Many changes have occurred to the tax laws, technology and public
perception. Consider that Propostion 2 1/2 and Classification have
made the tax financially acceptable to property owners. Consider too
that revaluation and the prospects of a CAMA system provide an
operative structure; that State regulations have standardized
procedures, established performance criteria and minimized local
discretionary influence. Today's technology offers new tools for
efficient administration. The political costs of revaluation are
history. These legal and political changes offer you the wherewithal!
to properly administer the tax. You have a clean slate.
Don't forget, this tax has problems. The desire to maximize revenue
will conflict with efforts to be equitable. It will continue to be
vulnerable to misuse. And further, the tax is politically volatile —
it will forever tempt policy makers to base actions on expedient,
self-serving and consequently misdirected policy.
It's going to be tough. First, you must commit to properly
administering the tax. Then you need professional management to
implement programs cited in this paper. Both the management and the
programs should be under Mayoral and Council review. And finally, to
bond this sensitive function to the rest of government you need to
build public confidence. Tax payers must know that there is equity
that they pay their fair share — and further, that the process has
integrity — that nobody has special benefits or access to power
through taxation.
A new chapter in property tax can be written. It might not be lively
or entertaining, but it won't end in a revolution.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A: The History of Property Tax Administration and the Current
Tax Environment
Since its inception the property tax has been poorly administered. It
often reflects the economic and political pressures of the time.
Often the tax administration decisions were made for laudable reasons,
but unfortunately, they more often than not ignored city-wide equity
among commercial, residential and industrial property owners and
strayed from the other primary goal of efficiently maintaining
revenues
.
Boston's Assessing Practices: a look back
Beyond its entertainment value, there is reason to glance back into
history. For one, the recent changes, as cited in the Statement of
Issues, allow for different administrative procedures. It is crucial
for the new administration to steer away from past practices; laws and
procedures are very different today. It is important for the new
administration to comprehend some of the expectations which special
interest groups have of the tax. It behooves any administration to
withstand pressures for a return to the "good old days." Finally,
because the recent changes were not comprehensive reform, the new
administration should understand what has been changed, and what
reform is yet to be accomplished.
There are Reasons for the Tax's Unpopularity
The property tax is complex. It has been talked about as corrupt.
Its economic shortcomings has rallied citizens to a revolution of
sorts. The criticism was all well deserved.
The major cause was the practice of setting assessments at less than
full and fair market value. This, known as fractional assessments,
meant that a $100,000 home is assessed at some value less than
$100,000. Say its assessment was $9,000, then its assessment-to-value
ratio is 9% ($9,000 r $100,000 = 9%). In and of itself assessing at
less than the offical rate -- which is 100% in MA was not a
problem, so long as the assessment-to-value ratio was the same for all
classes of property and for all the property within each class. That
is fair, just not legal. However, in Boston, not unlike other cities,
there was a tremendous disparity between the ratios for different
classes. As a point of information, taxes in Massachusetts must be
proportional.
In understanding why fractional assessment was the accepted practice
one should appreciate, first of all, that the disparity in varying
fractional assessments was a characteristic common to many large
assessing districts with heterogenous properties. It is difficult to
accurately assess any property and when the amount and types of
property increase the difficulty, literally magnifies exponentially.
Appraisal practices were more 'seat of the pants' or subjective than
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scientific. In a 1972 study prepared for the Finance Commission by
the Jacobs Co. it was determined that the Assessing Dept. had 7
different methods to determine value, none of which were uniform.
Maintaining information on values and changes was next to impossible
due to the lack of technology to assist in assimilating the
information and the Assessing Dept.'s budgetary constraints. All of
the processing work, was done by hand and the assessing was neither
systematized nor scientific. As some classes or neighborhoods
increased in value the mechanics of the system weren't in place to
make the corresponding changes. Soon those properties were
undervalued. Correspondingly, as some properties decreased in value
and some neighborhoods became less desirable those properties became
over assessed relative to the city-wide average. Clearly, if it is
difficult to determine the actual value it would be no more easy to
assess all property at a uniform, fractional assessment.
The following chart illustrates how extreme inequitable assessments
were in Boston. The impact is in the pocket book, which is measured
by the effective tax rate, or the percentage of the property's value
which must be paid each year as the tax. The last column on the chart
shows that the old commercial property paid at a rate of almost three
times new commercial. The city wide average is what each parcel would
pay if assessments were at 100% and Classification was not implemented
(which it would not be at that time.)
Inequities also existed within the residential class. In Charlestown
the assessment to value ratio was at 14%, whereas in Back Bay and
Beacon Hill it was 35% and in the Washington Park area of Roxbury it
was 44%. That resulted in tax burdens of $35 per $1000 of market
value in Charlestown, $71 in Back Bay and Beacon Hill and $90 in
Roxbury
.
Table 1: ASSESSMENT-TO-VALUE RATIOS AND EFFECTIVE TAX FOR CLASSES OF
PROPERTY—1972
CLASS ASSESSMENT- EFFECTIVE TAX ON $1000
TO-VALUE RATIO OF MARKET VALUE
RESIDENTIAL .27 $ 55
NEW COMMERCIAL .18 $ 37
OLD COMMERCIAL .52 $ 106
TOTAL (represents the
city wide average) .32 $ 66
Source: Estimating the Impact of 100% of Market Value Property Tax
Assessments of Boston Real Estate. The Boston Urban Observatory,
August, 1974
One startling statistic sums up Boston's assessing history: in the 50
years preceeding revaluation Boston's assessed values increased 4%
while the tax rate increased over 1000%!!!
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The System Was Insulated from Change
If it was so unfair, why didn't some special interest group change it?
Granted it was confusing, but it was costing certain property owners
thousands and millions of dollars. The problem was that the political
dynamics insulated it from change and the availability of abatements
insured that individual problems were resolved instead of revamping
the entire system.
No administration was motivated to implement 100% values. It took no
crystal ball and barely a consultant study to predict that correcting
the system would increase residential (read voters) taxes. Any
politician knows that increasing taxes is the ticket out of office.
The system remained.
The system was insulated from the implementation of full and fair
values, in part, through its mechanism of abatements. Abatements are
necessary. They correct inequitable assessments caused by individual
error or inequities inherent in the system. An unfortunate side
effect of providing this tax payer relief is that nobody has an
interest in correcting the systemic inequities. Abatements should not
be used as a remedy to an inequitable system. On an annual basis at
least 10% of properties had abatement requests. There was reason for
the cynical name of the Aoatement Dept.
To change the system, given that the Assessing Dept. would not correct
it itself, required a ten taxpayers suit. This is an exhaustive,
expensive process. Since the plantiffs motive was money, the
abatement procedure could easily be scuttled with an abatement.
It is curious that no special interest group did persist in effecting
a change in assessing practices. A review of the different classes of
property owners' political and economic situation explains why.
The owners of new commercial property certainly did not want change as
they enjoyed especially favorable low assessments. Favored
neighborhoods -- the W. Roxburies and Hyde Parks of the city wished
to preserve the status quo. This was assured through their strong
representation on the Council and concentration of city hall workers.
On the other hand, neighborhoods where property was over taxed always
seemed to have much more pressing demands. Roxbury, as an example,
was fighting arson, contesting highway clearance and distracted over
busing issues. Why didn't the owners of older commercial property
find it in their self interest to disrupt the system? They could be,
and they were, satisfied with abatements. Moreover, many of them felt
that what was good for Boston, and that meant continuation of the
status quo, was good for them.
Then too, it was unclear to all but a sophisticated few (and they were
generally the abatement lawyers) that the system was so grossly
inequitable. Remember ten years back -- prior to California's
contribution of Proposition 13 taxation simply did not receive the
same public attention as it does today.
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Taxation Used as a Planning Tool: the carrot approach
The confusion and lack of public accountability allowed for the tax to
be used for purposes other than raising revenue. In some instances it
was abused for political and personal gains. In others there were
good intentions to use the property tax as a carrot to stimulate
development or stabilize a neighborhood. For example, in the early
days of urban renewal rehabilitated South End properties were not to
be reassessed for seven years. This encouraged needed development and
home ownership. Or, for example, the city chose not to reassess
property unless it sold. This was a contribution to neighborhood
stability as well as a benefit for older homeowners. Particularly in
gentrifying neighborhoods this made it possible for residents to stay.
Another program, questionable in ?ome people's estimation, was the tax
deals with developers of the downtown office towers. These were the
private 'golden handshake' deals. They were special tax deals between
for profit developers in areas of the City which were not considered
blighted. The contents of the agreements were not open to public
review. They are not to be confused, although they generally are,
with the legal 121a agreements which are publicly acknowledged
agreements between the City and a limited dividend or non-profit
developer. The developer does pay a certain, pre-arranged tax based
on value and income. Further the developer is restricted to building
in certain, blighted areas and must meet other public obligations.
The argument for the 'golden handshakes' was that had the developers
not been promised a stabilized tax rate they might not have located in
the city. The argument against them is that there was a legal
mechanism available which would have been public, brought in more
taxes and not obligated the developer to the Mayor.
In and of themselves this composite of tax deals might appear to be
wise ways to run a city. But, as a comprehensive program they were
not fair. The owners of property in the gentrifying South End were
having their taxes paid, in part, by the owner in the market depressed
Roxbury. The latter couldn't afford to move, no matter how high the
taxes were. While the old commercial downtown property suffered lack
of tenants with the rising of each new commercial development they
also paid outrageously high taxes to support the city's development
policy. No doubt about it, this was bad administration of the tax,
although the deliberate policy choices may have been good for city
development. It points out one of the tax's inherent defects, that it
is vulnerable to misuse. The temptation to use the property tax for
nonprimary purposes takes it off course from its primary goals of
equity and providing revenue.
Lack of Standards Resulted in Weak Controls
Whereas the presence of fractional assessments easily lead to the
planning tool function, it was the lack of standards and technological
control over assessing which allowed for little internal control over
the assessors and administrators of the tax. Given the magnitude of
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assessing in Boston it was easy to hide mistakes. Or as has been
proven elsewhere in government that it is difficult to prove either
incompetence or corruption. These covers allowed for sloppy work and
even personal gain.
Diane Paul's book. The Politics of Property Tax compared the nature
of the street assessor to the police. "Assessing, like police work,
is both discretionary and subjective, combining constant temptation
with minimal likelihood of exposure." She points out that "the
decisions made by urban assessors are sometimes of great importance to
taxpayers, particularly owners of apartment buildings and commercial
and industrial property and it is precisely for these kinds of
property that well-defined standards of assessment are lacking" (p. 8)
The differences which she points out, that assessing is not as visiole
and is less understood than police work, illustrate why there is
little external control as well as internal control over tax
administration
.
An amusing example of this lack of control and standards is that
buildings on one side of downtown Washington St. had lower assessments
than the buildings on the other side. The history behind it, as oral
tradition has passed it down, was that the assessing district was
split down the middle of Washington St. and the respective assessors
didn't talk to each other.
Another predominant characteristic is that taxes were too high. The
effective tax burden (the property tax as a percentage of the market
value) prior to the implementation of Prop 2 1/2 was 10%. It was no
surprise that Boston voters supported Prop 2 1/2 by a 9 to 7 margin.
The reaction to these problems the inequity and abuse brought about
by poor administration and excessive tax burdens due in large part to
the economic shortcomings of the tax was successful litigation and
changes to the tax laws. Both government and citizens have
participated in designing solutions to these problems. The result was
dramatic changes to how municipalities can tax. These changes are
explained in the remainder of this section.
The Changes: you may have voted for them
The court ordered enforcement of full and fair market value
assessments, or 100%, brought a radical change: city-wide equity in
taxes. Classification, passed in 1978, cushioned 100%'s financial
impacts on residential property owners. It maintained the de facto
practice of under taxing residential properties. Further,
Classification's enabling legislation provided massive tax reform by
establishing standards and providing some municipalities abatement
relief. Public rage, was expressed in the 1980 passage of Proposition
2 1/2. This limited the tax levy. Technological advances and the use
of computers, which allow for efficient and accurate accounting,
dramatically changed the assessor's ability to maintain records. The
following explains these changes and highlights how they offer new
tools for Boston to properly administer the tax.
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100% Assessments
The 1974 Supreme Judicial Court's decision of Sudbury v. Commissioner
of Corporations and Taxation Mass. Ad. Sh 2405 (1974) forced all MA
municipalities to comply with the constitutional requirement that all
assessments be proportional. This required all municipalities to
assess all property at its full and fair market value. The decision
was simple.
The effects were not so simple. It abolished fractional assessment
practices. And with it went de facto classification and a history of
unfair distribution of State aid based on the total real estate value
of the municipality. With equity came disruption or fear of
disruption. Most residential tax payers did not understand that prior
inequities were in their favor. Refer to Table 1 and compare the
effective tax burden of residential to the city wide average. The
interpretation is that residential taxes would increase if all
property was assessed proportionately. Taxpayers at that time would
be hard pressed to believe this. San Francisco responded best when
shocked by its own revaluation; bumper stickers begged "Bring Back the
Crooked Tax Assessor".
DOR Gains Enforcement Powers
As a result of the Sudbury decision, the State Department of Revenue
(DOR) was given enforcement powers over local assessing offices.
Additional court cases, Classification's enabling legislation and
pressure from certain, already revalued municipalities extended the
powers and influenced the DOR to take their role very seriously. The
DOR now establishes state wide standards and has a strong supervisory
role. It is capable of denying certification of new assessments (it
has in the case of Cambridge)
,
holding up certifying tax rates for
auditing reasons (such as Boston's FY 1984 tax rate), forcing
localities to fund revaluation contracts and carrying out the
revaluation themself with funds secured through deducting the
municipality's State aid.
Classification is More Than Shifting the Tax Burden Between Classes
Whereas the Sudbury decision meant an enforcement of existing law, two
other major changes-- Proposition 2 1/2 and Classification—were
changes to the tax law.
Classification was a 1978 voter referendum which amended the State's
Constitution. It permitted the classification of property and its
taxation according to the property's use. As is the process with any
constitutional amendment change there must be enabling legislation to
specifically instruct how the change is to be carried out. The
initial legislative attempts established a mandatory system. The
final legislation, known as Chapter 797 of the General Laws of 1979,
established a local option, flexible system to allocate the tax burden
among major classes of property.
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Chapter 797 devised an unique mechanism to implement the approving
taxpayer's spirit to shift taxes. It established four classes of
property: residential, open space, commercial and industrial. Then it
allowed different tax rates for the residential, open space and
commercial/ industrial/personal property classes of property. The
residential rate can be no less than 65% of what that class's full
share is. It can be as low as 65% so long as the commercial,
industrial and personal property class's share does not exceed 150% of
its full value share. The tax rates can also be the same for all
classes (this made it applicable to smaller municipalities with a
minimal amount of commercial property.) In addition each municipality
can implement a residential exemption. It can be from to 10% of the
municipality's average residential parcel's value. Each residential
parcel receives the same exemption. The DOR reviews the distribution
as part of the certifying process.
In Boston the implementation of classification occurred in FY 1983.
The favorable impact for residential is that it constitutes 46% of the
value but pays only 30% of the tax levy. Without classification the
resiaential class would pay the 46%. The difference is about $750 per
parcel 1
Table 7: VALUE OF REAL ESTATE AND TAX SHARE BY CLASS — FY 1983
CLASS
ASSESSED PERCENT OF
VALUE TOTAL VALUE
SHARE OF TAX BILL
$ PER CENT
RESIDENTIAL & LAND
COMMERCIAL
INDUSTRIAL
PERSONAL PROPERTY
$ 5.7 BIL
4.0
.7
1.8
TOTAL $12.2 B
Source: Boston Assessing Dept.
Table 8: IMPACT OF CLASSIFICATION
.46
.33
.06
. 15
CLASS
SHARE OF TAX BURDEN
FY 1983 FY 1983
$ 114 MIL
164
29
67
$ 374 M
.30
.44
.08
.18
RESIDENTIAL .38 .30
COMMERCIAL .38 .44
INDUSTRIAL .11 .08
PERSONAL PROPERTY .14 .18
SOURCE: Boston Assessing Dept.
Needless to mention. Classification went a long way towards making
revaluation acceptable i.e. along with Proposition 2 1/2 's lowering of
the tax rate it reduced the residential sector's taxes. Property
owners focused their attention on a lower tax bill and not the issue
at hand whether the assessment was accurate.
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In all cases, the law requires full and fair valuation in order for a
municipality to implement classification.
Chapter 797 was pervasive tax reform encompassing more than a workable
law to implement classification. It provided relief to Boston
relative to the Tregor v Board of Assessors (Mass, 387 NE 2nd (1979))
and it improved assessing standards and performance throughout the
state. These three aspects of the law are explained below.
Tax Abatements: Tregor becomes a household word
One provision in the Classification law held municipalities harmless
for inequitable assessments in excess of the municipality's average.
This provided relief for two years, until revaluation was completed.
It was immediatly challenged in court under the Kenniston v. Board of
Assessors (Mass, 407 NE 2nd 1275 (1980)). The SJC decision upheld
797 's provision to award abatements at the municipal average level,
but only for abatement application for FY1980 to FY1983. The massive
backlog of abatements, estimated at about $150 million, would still be
decided on Tregor's most favored class ruling. Even with this
restriction it was estimated that Boston would be 'saved' $50 million
each year. The court noted that the proper remedy was revaluation and
not abatements. They agreed to the average assessment only as a
sympathetic response to municipalities' financial problems. To
underscore their belief that this was a temporary measure the
provision would expire at the end of the 1983 fiscal year, the time
when revaluation was scheduled for completion.
Chapter 797 Also Established Assessing Standards
Chapter 797 had a major impact on improving assessing standards. DOR
may establish minimum standards of performance, require certain record
keeping, issue guides for rules and give 'binding opinions on taxation
questions. The law requires local assessors to meet certain minimum
qualifications. DOR can require them to take special training. This
appears to be harmless, although it was hotly contested at the time.
Biennial certification (changed to triennial in 1983) by DOR is
required to implement classification and certification requires
assessments to be at full and fair values. (There is proposed
legislation to further weaken this to every five years.)
By providing uniformity and standards the law was establishing
consistent procedures for localities. This, in turn, provided for
objective practices and insulation from local political decisions.
The result should be a more professional assessment environment.
Proposition 2 1/2: a tealess revolution
Proposition 2 1/2 was a voter initiative referendum, overwhelmingly
passed in 1980. It is best known for its limit of the property tax
levy to 2 1/2% of the value of a municipality's taxable property. It
had several interesting effects.
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As previously mentioned Classification and Prop 2 1/2 mitigated 100%'s
potential tax shifts from the commercial to the residential. In
Boston the implementation of a 15% tax cut and a shift of taxes
lowered the majority of residential tax bills. This resulted in
general acceptance of the revaluation process, a complacent public and
consequently little disruption to the existing political process.
Classification and Prop 2 1/2 gives the public an expectation of what
their tax should be. Most people know the value of their home.
Further they know that Prop 2 1/2 limits the tax to 2 1/2% of the
citywide value. (Actually, this is generally misunderstood as 2 1/2%
of each individual property, which in theory it should be if all
properties are at full and fair value). And they know that
classification shifts some of that tax burden to the commercial and
industrial classes. A property owner can answer the question of how
much tax they should pay. This breakthrough in public understanding
introduces public accountability in the tax system.
Technology: R2D2 to the rescue
Another event has slowly and quietly occurred. It is the adaptation
of computer technology to assessing practices and advances in
appraisal theories. Computers allow for methodical assimulation of
vast quantities of information. Values can be readily updated.
Appraisal, as a science, is easing out the acceptance of subjectivity
of prior assessing in favor of objective standards developed through
sophisticated appraising techniques. They offer the tools to
implement an affordable system wiiich is accurate and up to date.
The Context--A New Tax Environment
The reoccuring theme of these changes is that the political and legal
constraints on tax administration are much improveci. The City has
equalized values, the political costs of revaluation are history,
reasonable laws and standards are being enforced, new laws have been
passed, technology has introduced efficiency and accuracy. This
structure allows for an efficient, professional administration of the
tax
.
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Appendix B: Explanation and Critique of the Trending Analysis Used to
Increase the Fiscal Year 1984 Values
This appendix explains the fiscal impact of trending for Boston's
budget, what trending is and what some problems are with trending
analysis. Assessment to sales ratios for the year preceding
revaluation, year of revaluation and the year immediately following
demonstrate that assessments were inaccurate within one year of
revaluation. The manual system, such as was used for revaluation did
not retain full and fair assessments.
Values Increase, Tax Rates Decrease: 2 1/2% at Last
A combination of increasing the assessments and decreasing the tax
rates brought Boston's tax levy in compliance with Propostion 2 1/2 's
tax cap. The total value of taxable property increased from the FY
1983 level of $12.5 Billion to $13.3 Billion in FY 1984. Of the
$800 million increase about one half was a result of new
construction and substantial rehabilitation being added to the tax
base for the first time. The other half was an increase of existing
valuation to maintain parity with the increase in real estate values.
An 11% decrease in the tax rates, resulting in a $333 million tax
levy, completed the third and final year of Propostion 2 1/2 's
mandated tax rate reductions. Any future tax rate reductions will be
due to a change in valuation.
Trending Analysis Uniformly Increases Values
To increase the existing values the Assessing Dept. used a method
known as trending. It's intent is to maintain assessments at market
levels. DOR accepts trending for the years between their required
tri-annual reassesssment
.
In brief, trending increases or decreases each property's assessment.
Properties are aggregated according to class and neighborhood. The
percentage change is based on the principal indicators of value which
were previously used to estimate the current assessed value. The
predominate indicator for residential property was sales, as used in
the market approach. Income, expense and interest rates, as used in
the capitalization of income approach, besides sales were the
predominant indicators for all other classes.
The arms-length sales for the calender year 1982 were the basis for
determining the increase in market value. Arms-length means that the
property was sold by a willing seller to a willing buyer and did not
involve any unique factors influencing the price, such as a sale
between relatives, a foreclosure, government sale, zoning change among
other disqualifications. Each arms-length sale was compared to their
assessed value. This produced a sales to assessment ratio (typically
an assessment to sales ratio is calculated.) Then the median ratio
for each class of property within each neighborhood was calculated.
The ratio is then adjusted by several factors. Knowledge of the
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market, acknowledgement of assessment's accuracy, time lag adjustments
to sales were considered along with what was designated as the key
factor, the reduction in mortgage rates. This resulting rate measures
the overall rate of increase (or decrease) in the market value for
each class in each neighborhood. Once the respective rates are
determined they are applied to all properties in their aggregate
class. In summation, this applies the average market increase to all
properties' assessed values with the intention of maintaining parity
with the market.
This analysis is successful only if the assessed value represented
100%, or full value in FY 1983. To the extent the assessment was
below 100% the ratio will be greater than the actual market increase.
There is no statistical means to determine what proportion of the
ratio increase is based on increased sales prices and what proportion -
is based on under assessed properties.
Relative to a specific example trending works as follows. All single
family homes in the South End, Back Bay, Beacon Hill, Waterfront,
Fenway, Chinatown and North End were considered one aggregate. There
were 26 arms length sales with a median sales to assessment ratio of
1.082, indicating that within the range of the 26 sales, the one with
a 1.082 ratio was in the middle (as compared to the mean or average
ratio.) Considering declining mortgage rates and other market factors
the final trending factor for single family homes in this neighborhood
was 1.09%. That rate was uniformily applied to each single family
home's assessed value. Consider, for example, two houses both
assessed at $80,000 and only one which sold in July, 1982, for
$100,000. Both assessmnets were increased by .09% or $7200. The new
assessed value is $87,200.
Some specific details on the residential trending are as follows.
Single, two and three family houses were divdied into 14 neighborhood
districts, similar to the BRA's planning districts. Condominiums were
divided into 23 districts. All four of these categories used the
sales data as the principal indicator of value.
Table 9: THE RANGE OF TRENDING RATES FOR RESIDENTIAL—FY 1984
CLASS
FACTOR
VALUE TO ASSESSMENT RATIO FINAL TRENDING
Rl
R2
R3
Condo
.987-1.146
1.000-1.215
.983-1.254
.962-1.250
03-. 10
03-. 10
06-. 10
0-.06
Source: Assessing Dept.
Some specifics on commercial are as follows. The commercial category
included income producing residential property in excess of 3 units,
residential/commercial, commercial and industrial properties.
Although the income producing residential properties are included in
the commercial category they are taxed at the residential rate. Their
inclusion is because the principal indicator of value is the income.
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expenses and interest rates.
There were two districts: the downtown one includes downtown. Back
Bay, Beacon Hill, Waterfront, North End, Chinatown Fenway and the
other is the rest of Boston.
The principle behind the trending was the same as for the residential.
It measured the rate of change in the market, as determined on certain
properties, and applied that rate to all properties within the same
aggregate. The principal indicators of value were the 1982 sales and
the changes in factors contributing to the capitalization of income
approach, which were interest rates, income, expenses. Income and
expenses both rose with no appreciable net change. Interest rates,
however, decreased which correspondingly changes the capitalization
rate and increases property values. The Assessing Dept. used what
they believed to be a conservative capitalization rate. Coupled with
the sales to assessment ratio the final trending factors were as
fol lows
.
Table 10: TRENDING RATES FOR CLASSES OF PROPERTY—FY 1984
DOWNTOWN DISTRICT OTHER DISTRICT
MEDIAN S/A RATIO MEDIAN S/A RATIO
CLASS & TRENDING FACTOR & TRENDING FACTOR
RESIDENTIAL * 1.10 1.09 .92 1.04
Commercial 1.12 1.09 1.06 1.05
Industrial 1.12 1.09 1.25 1.09
* Includes R4
,
Apartments and Residential-Commercial
Source: Assessing Dept.
Problems with Trending Analysis
There are two problematic factors with the trending analysis. One is
that there was a small number of arms-length transactions in several
wards. Because of this the original neighborhood districts could not
be used. There should be at least 20 sales and preferrably 30 to be
statistically significant. It appears that some neighborhoods were
created as a result of the sample size. For example, the intown one
consists of Fenway and Beacon Hill, Back Bay, North End, South End,
Chinatown and the Waterfront. There really is no happy solution,
either the statistical review's significance is compromised or
neighborhoods are drawn within which there are different market
trends. It is important to be cognizant of this limitation.
The other problem is the use of the median as the only statistical
measure. The median is the middle value when the values are arranged
in order of their magnitude. The median indicates the tendency
towards the center. It does not indicate the range in values, or
simply the difference between the highest and lowest ratios. Nor does
the median in and of itself explain how uniform the values are, i.e.
whether the ratios are consistently similar to the median or are
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spread out within the range of values or are otherwise dispersed
within the range. Subsequently, the trending analysis did not
indicate whether properties were particularly over or underassessed.
The typical measure of assessment quality uniformity is the
Coefficient of Dispersion (COD) from the median. It measures how
uniform the individual assessments are to the market value. DOR
requires CCDs to be 10% or less as part of the certification process
(although not as part of the trending)
.
In conjunction with this project the CCDs were calculated by ward, for
the single family properties, for the year following revaluation.
This information is on Table 2, page 11. The median indicates that
the existing assessed values were lower than the prices of the 1982
arms length sales. The difference can be attributable to both market
influences and under assessment. The CCDs, when at 10% or less says
that most ratios were fairly consistent with the median.
CODs for the year of revaluation are compared to the year following
revaluation, again refer to Table 2. CODs in excess of 10% indicate a
lack of uniformity i.e. many assessments were very different from the
sales prices. By then comparing the year following to the year
preceding revaluation (Table 3 on page 12) one sees that CODs are
beginning to approach the same unacceptable level which required
revaluation
!
As a point of information the CODs were not calculated for other
classes of housing and therefore equity between classes, i.e. whether
single families are under or over assessed relative to multi-family or
commercial buildings was not measured.
(One cautionary comment on the year of revaluation is necessary. OPE
used 1981 sales, as the process calls for, as a factor in estimating
the values. Prior to a municipality submitting information to DOR
they know that one of DOR's statistical tests is the COD on single
family homes. It cannot exceed 10%. Therefore, they know, before
turning over information to DOR, to what extent the assessments must
match the 1981 sales i.e. they can 'pass the test' by matching the
assessments on the 1981 sold properties with the sales price. This is
called 'sales chasing'. Analysts of the revaluation process believe
that the City did do this.)
This comparison of the CODs identifies two points. If the 1981 sales
were used to fit the value, then it is doubtful that the system which
was used is accurate. Properties which had not sold had less
information available upon which to determine the assessment and
therefore would lack accuracy. Also, considering the tremendous
disparity with the 1982 CODs, trending is an unacceptable process,
when applied to the manual system. This research's conclusion is that
a CAMA system is the only way to achieve and maintain equitable values
and support the use of trending analysis.
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APPENDIX C: Proposition 2 1/2 Regulations
Proposition 2 1/2 Changes Our Lives
Whether it was tax payer stinginess, public rage over the
legislature's inaction on tax matters, voter irritation with
government spending, or all of the above, voters approved Proposition
2 1/2 by a 3-2 margin in November, 1980. In marked a dramatic turning
point in the State's municipal finance.
Propostion 2 1/2 was an initiative petetion and as such it required
action by the State legislature to become law. They subsequently
passed Chapter 580 of the acts of 1980. This was amended by the
legislature in 1981 as Chapter 782. Propostion 2 1/2 can continue to
be amended.
It is important for the City's next administration to understand how
Prop 2 1/2 functions in order to maximize revenues within its
constraints. This appendix explains the different provisions which
affect Boston's tax levy. As a cumulative result, and as a summary to
the Proposition 2 1/2 discusssion, the City should expect to capture
tax levy increases based on growth and increasing property values.
However, without voter approval the City of Boston will be taxing at
less the 2 1/2% by the forthcoming fiscal year.
Proposition 2 1/2 Regulations
The reader deserves caution before preceeding: the law has become
extremely complex.
Proposition 2 1/2 's Golden Rule is: the tax levy can not exceed 2 1/2%
of the full and fair market value of the municipality's taxable
property [Chapter 792, Section 21c (b) ] . True to Prop 2 1/2 there is
an exception to this; a municipality's debt service can be excluded
from the limit thereby allowing the total levy to exceed the 2 1/2%
level [Chapter 782, Section 21c (a)]. (As a point of clarification an
original provision of the law allowed voters to override the 2 1/2%
level. The 1981 amendment disallowed this override.)
Some other generalizations of Propostion 2 1/2 frame the parameters of
the law. The regulations require tax increases to be tied, as one
would expect, to the growth in the tax base. The levy's increase is
limited, however, to not only the Golden Rule's 2 1/2% limit, but
also to the prior year's tax levy. The 1981 amendment, Chapter 782,
introducted flexibility for municipalities to better adapt the tax to
their specific needs. They allow, on the one hand, for specific
exclusions which enable a municipality to increase taxes. These
require voter approval. But, they also protect the spirit of Prop 2
1/2 by dismissing the prior opportunity to override the 2 1/2% levy
restriction. The regulations also respond to municipalities unique
situations. Through voter approval some flexibility is available.
Specific regulation, which could possibly affect Boston, are as
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follows
:
1. Increases to the tax levy:
The tax levy can increase or decrease through one or both of the
following conditions.
o valuation of existing properties can increase to maintain
parity with market appreciation, refered to in this paper as
•valuation increase'.
o valuation can be added to the tax base through new
construction, substantial rehabilitation or a change in tax exempt
status, referred to in this paper as 'growth increase'.
In more detail, they are as follows:
a) 'Valuation Increase'
•Valuation increase' is the amount of value which assessments are
increased between fiscal years. For example, the 'valuation increase'
between FY 1983 and FY 1984 was approximately $800 million or a
citywide increase of approximately 8%. This increase was determined
by the Assessing Dept. through the use of trending analysis. (Refer
to Appendix B) . Every third year, when a municipality's values must
be recertified by the DOR, the values may change. In interim years
the values may change through the trending analysis. In the case of
the 'valuation increase' the new levy is determined by multiplying the
prior year's levy by 102.5%. (Mathematically this is simply increaing
the levy by 2 1/2%) . The formula for valuation increase is FY 1984 X
102.5% = FY 1985 levy, so long as this is no more than 2 1/2% of the
total taxable valuation.
Remember the Golden Rule: the new levy can be no more than 2 1/2% of
the total value. Therefore, if 'valuation' and 'growth' did not
increase by at least 2 1/2% then the levy can not be increased the
full 102.5%. If, in considering the other extreme, the 'valuation
increase' is more than 2 1/2%, the municipality must forgo the tax
levy increase above the 2.5% level. There is an exception to the
normal procedures. It allows a municipality to take advantage of the
value in excess of the 2 1/2 level. This is a voter approval to
increase the prior year's levy by more than 2 1/2% (while still
remaining within the Golden Rule)
.
b) 'Growth Increase'
'Growth increase', is the addition of new or rehabilitated parcels'
value. For example between FY 1983 and FY 1984 approximately $345
million was added to the tax base. Any demolished or substantially
deteriorated parcels would be deleted from the tax base. Change in
tax exemption status either adds or deletes value. Sub-divisions and
condo conversions which are transferred to individual parcels are
included in this category.
The tax levy increase, as a result of the 'growth increase', is
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determined by the prior year's tax rate. (One might expect, in
contrast to the actual procedure, that the increased assessments would
simply be added to the tax base and thereby incorporated into the new
levy. However, like the increase due to market valuation, the levy is
tied to the prior year.) The procedure is to 1) determine the amount
of value in the commercial/industrial and personal property class and
multiply it by the prior year's commercial rate, 2) determine the
amount of residential increase and multiply that by the prior year's
residential rate and 3) add the two amounts together. The sum is the
new tax levy allowable due to growth.
The formula for the allowable tax levy increase is:
Prior FY's
Tax Levy X 102.5 +
Next Year's Tax Levy (so long as the sum does not exceed 2 1/2% of
the value of all taxable property
2. Increasing the Levy Growth by More Than 2 1/2%
As previously mentioned the 'valuation increase's' levy growth in
excess of 2 1/2% is not captured under normal P^^ocedures . This section
discusses what can be done if the 'valuation increase' does exceed 2
1/2%.
Given voter approval the levy can be increased by more than io2 1/2 %
of the prior year's levy but only to the limit of the Golden Rule,
i.e. the levy can not exceed 2 1/2 % of the full and fair market
value. This would allow the tax levy to be at the full 2 1/2% level.
If not approved the effective tax rate will fall below the 2 1/2%
level
.
The process to secure approval is initiated by a 2/3s vote of the City
Council calling for the measure to be voted on in an upcoming election
or to call for an election. One or both questions can be asked at
such an election. One would request increasing the levy from 2 1/2 %
up to 5%. This would require a majority of the voters approving. The
other would request increasing the levy more than 5%. This would
require that 2/3 of the voters approve the referendum.
The fiscal implications are dependent upon whether the political
environment would behoove the Council to call for an election and if
the voters would approve such an override. Recent voter referendums
throughout the United States have actually favored tax increases.
A worrisome implication from the inability to capture the full 2 1/2%
under normal procedures is that there is less demand to maintain
assessments at their market values—at least when the assessment
increase exceeds any revenue benefits. The mostlikely scenerio is
that the residential values would not be maintained at 100%. It might
X
Prior Year's
Res. Tax Rate
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please property owners (read voters) but it would be the new beginning
of inequitable assessments.
3. Excluding Debt Obligations from the Golden Rule's 2 1/2% Limit:
The interest a municipality pays on bonds can be excluded from the
Golden Rule's 2 1/2 levy limits given voter approval. The levy limit
is determined, in Boston's FY85 case, by adding the growth and
valuation increases to the FY 1984 's $333 million levy. Then, given
voter approval, interest payments on certain bonding is added to the
levy. (Tax anticipation notes are not included.) The spirit behind
this exclusion is to allow for needed capital expansion such as
construction of a school. Enactment of the exclusion requires the
majority of voter approval following the City Council's 2/3 vote to
call an election. The question before the voters are to exclude
either pre-2 1/2 debt and/or, on an issue to issue basis, the post
2/1/2 debt.
Due to a quirk in calculating the allowable levy it so happens that to
exclude the pre-2 1/2% debt results in a lowered tax levy! This saves
the city from asking one of the questions.
To estimate the amount of money which Boston could increase their levy
it is necessary to assume certain bonding levels and rates of
interest. These assumptions are taken from Katharine L. Bradbury and
John Yinger's Adjusting to the 1980s^; Boston's Fiscal Situation in
the Years Ahead , 1983. In their report they project the following
bonding: $20 million in FY 1984; $30 million in FY 1985 and $40
million in FY 1986. The authors believe this to be well below
baseline borrowing. They assume 20 year serial bonds at 9 % interest.
Therefore, in FY 1984 the interest is $1.8 million, in FY 1985 the
interest is $4.4 million and in FY 1986 the interest is $7.8 million.
This is the amount which could be added to the levy in each respective
year.
In practical terms this may be a difficult exclusion upon which to
gain voter approval. Newton, when faced with the need to provide for
a new library, voted 3-2 against such an exclusion in November, 1983.
There was considerable sentiment against 'violating Prop 2 1/2'.
There was poor public understanding that this provision actually was
Prop 2 1/2 's acceptable procedure to adapt the law to a municipality's
unique needs.
4. State Advances of State Aid to Pay Debt Service
In the event a municipality can not meet payments incurred through debt
service they can borrow that amount of money from the State as an
advance on their State aid. This does not forgo any financial
responsibility on the part of the municipality; it merely postpones
the expense.
The process works by the municipality certifing to the DOR
Commissioner that they are unable to pay principal or interest due on
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bonds, notes or certificates of indebtedness. To the extent there are
funds payable to the municipality, as tallied on the Cherry Sheet,
they can be distributed in advance. This provision does not pledge
the Commonwealth to a locality's payment.
5. Other Municipal Tax Authorities:
Originally other municipal taxing authorities were restricted to
increasing their levy by no more than 2 1/2% of the prior year's levy.
Chapter 782 now exempts them from any limitation. This applies to the
Water and Sewer Commission, If the City succeeds in establishing a
commission for fire services that too would be in this category. The
implication is favorable as it means that general revenue would not
have to be used for any bail out of these independent services.
6. Limitation on State assessments: Originally any State
assessments, such as the MDC or MBTA, was limited to a 4 % increase
over the prior year's assessment. Chapter 782 decreased this amount
to 2 1/2 % of the prior year's assessment.
7. Levy Reduction: The tax levy can be reduced below the 2 1/2% level
if approved by voter referenda. The question would be placed on the
ballot either through 2/3 vote of the coucil or a voter initiative.
Passage would require majority vote.
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APPENDIX D: Requirements for Income Producing Tax Exempt Properties
Revaluation of tax exempt properties was given less priority than the
tax paying ones. Accurate assessments and auditing of accounts are
important to determine whether certain income producing, tax-exempt
properties are paying taxes. There is reason to believe that some tax
exempts are incorrectly exempted.
A charitable organization whose property produces income must meet
certain requirements to maintain its tax exempt status. The law's
interpretation of these regulations are one, that the institution
owning the property must be a public charity and two, the property
must be used for the charitable purposes of the organization. In the
case of income generation, the law further states that the income
cannot be the principle purpose of the use, even if that income is for
support of the charity. Rather, the use must be for the purposes for
which the institution was incorporated. Charitable organization can
use their properties for generating income so long as: the dominant
use of the property is for the organization's charitable purpose, no
profits are distributed among the members of the corporation, and the
income-generating use was necessary for the functioning of that
organization. For example, a building used primarily to print
literature which is sold, is not exempt, even if the income is
distributed to the charitable organization. On the other hand, a
parking garage belonging to a hospital was exempt.
Extensive information on this subject is in Institutional Property
Tax Exemptions In Massachusetts , The Massachusetts Taxpayers
Foundation, Boston, MA 1971.
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